The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 legislates a system of managing spent nuclear fuel that results in its permanent disposal in appropriate geological repositories. Although a repository site has been identified, studied, and mostly developed as provided for by this law, the actual completion and use of the repository is still decades off with the potential for public and legal actions preventing it from ever being operational. In the meantime, nuclear reactor technology, energy use and demand, energy production effects on the environment, public-policy mechanisms, and medical knowledge have all evolved and can be seen to continue to evolve such that the assumptions and basis for the Nuclear Waste Policy Act may no longer be appropriate for the current inventory of spent nuclear fuel. In addition, the proposal to change the nature of spent fuel management through the development of reprocessing techniques places new demands on managing possible spent fuel waste streams in the future.
In light of the current situation and prospect of future developments relevant to managing spent nuclear fuel, the Health Physics Society (HPS) takes the following positions:
1. The HPS believes the management of spent fuel from nuclear reactors should be conducted in a manner that (a) uses only scientifically valid and reasonable assumptions for setting protection standards, (b) adequately protects the public and environment from radiation exposure resulting from natural, accidental, or malevolent release of radioactive materials from the spent fuel, (c) accommodates evolving technologies, and (d) does not permanently dispose of potentially valuable material that is contained in a spent-fuel assembly.
2. The HPS believes that the development of new reactor technology that is intended for commercial production of electrical power must (a) integrate the characteristics of waste streams created by this new technology into the design of the new technology and process from the very beginning of its development, (b) design the framework to manage the new waste stream with equal importance to designing the technology itself, and (c) incorporate input and involvement from the regulatory authority that will regulate the technology and resulting waste stream once it is producing commercial power.
PS022-1 2 3. Regarding position 1.(a) above, the HPS believes the radiation protection standards recommended in its position statement "Ionizing Radiation-Safety Standards for the General Public" (HPS 2003) are appropriate for application to potential public exposure associated with management of spent nuclear fuel.
4. Regarding position 1.(b) above, the HPS believes the scientific validity and reasonableness of assumptions regarding the estimation of cancer and genetic risk from radiation exposure only allows the risk estimates to be extrapolated out for a period on the order of several generations (that is, on the order of a hundred years) but no more than a few hundred years. The basis for this is that today's limited knowledge of radiation risk mechanisms results in the necessity of knowing the lifestyles and underlying cancer and genetic experience of the population for which the risk is being estimated, and it is unreasonable to think these can be known beyond a few generations. Of course, this limitation may be changed as our knowledge of the radiation risk mechanisms improves, which is an example of needing to have a spent nuclear fuel management system that accommodates evolving technologies (i.e., position 1.(c) above).
Regarding positions 1.(c) and 1.(d) above, the HPS makes the following recommendations:
1. Spent nuclear fuel should be designated for monitored interim retrievable storage for a period intended to be at least 100 years but with a possibility of being as long as 300 years.
2. An independent expert study should be performed to inform a risk-based decision on whether the location of the interim retrievable storage for up to 300 years should be on-site where the spent nuclear fuel is generated, should be centralized in the Yucca Mountain repository, or should be in some other configuration or location. This study should evaluate if any of these options present an unacceptable risk to the public and the environment from radiation exposure due to the presence of the spent nuclear fuel and due to the natural, accidental, or malevolent release of radioactive materials from the spent fuel.
3. Radiation protection standards should be developed for the interim storage facility or facilities based on a 300-year storage period. Radiation protection standards should not be developed for final permanent disposal/disposition of the spent nuclear fuel or wastes produced by processing the spent fuel until technologies and knowledge advance to the point of allowing a scientifically valid decision on final disposition.
4. The storage facility or facilities should be designed to have appropriate monitoring to ensure the integrity of the storage containers and facility or facilities remain intact throughout the storage period.
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Health Physics Society. I am very appreciative also of the follow up questions you forwarded to me. They are very important to the future of the Yucca Mountain project and I am pleased to be able to provide further input on these issues.
I have enclosed my responses to your questions. In addition, during the hearing Senator Boxer posed a question regarding a statement attributed to Dr. Thomas Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council in which I gave a preliminary response but which required more study for a complete answer. I have enclosed my detailed response to Senator Boxer's question with this letter. Finally, I consider that some of the scientific principles provided in response to questions from Senator Inhofe have a profound implication on the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the EPA proposed standards and I have taken the liberty to share my view on this issue in a separate enclosure to this response. I hope this material will be helpful to you and your staffs.
On behalf of the Health Physics Society, I am honored to have been asked to assist you in this important and challenging task facing the Committee. Please do not hesitate to contact the Health Physics Society, or me, at any time you believe we can be a resource on any radiation safety issue. 
Summary Response
It is not possible to quantify the radiation risk at any level of radiation exposure for a population 10,000 to 1 million years from now, which is the time period for which the EPA proposal is applicable. This is due to the fact that there is no technical basis for forecasting the causes of death among, and the life spans that will be experienced by, the affected groups. Without this, and related information, the risk estimates cannot be quantified and any proposed dose rate limit is meaningless. This point is so important to the evaluation of the EPA proposal for Yucca Mountain that I have covered this is a separate enclosure to this submittal titled "Implications of Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of Appeals."
Risk coefficients exist for quantifying the health effects (i.e., fatal cancers) that may occur in a large existing population exposed to 350 millirem (mrem) per year. The resulting estimates, however, incorporate so many assumptions that they are highly uncertainty and, as noted above, they are applicable only to populations with today's (i.e., known) cancer rate experience and human life spans. As for the range of the uncertainties, the Health Physics Society (HPS, 2004) cautions that the "Estimation of health risk associated with radiation doses that are of similar magnitude as those received from natural sources should be strictly qualitative and encompass a range of hypothetical health outcomes, including the possibility of no adverse health effects."
Introduction
There are multiple factors that must be considered in estimating the risks of radiation exposures. The more important of these are discussed below.
Quantifying Risk
Lifetime risk estimates are developed through the science of epidemiology. Fundamental to this process is the comparison of the health outcomes of a group of people, exposed to higher doses, to the health outcomes of a similar group (i.e., similar age, gender, nationality, cancer rates, etc), exposed to lower doses. After accounting for all potentially confounding factors, increases in the number of cases of illness and death that occur in the exposed group, as compared to the non-exposed, or less exposed (control) group, are attributed to the radiation exposure. It is important to recognize, however, that this is the observed increase in the risk for the exposed group at the time the comparison was made. To obtain the lifetime risk estimate, the observed difference must be projected to a time when everyone in both the exposed and control groups has died. This is particularly significant in terms of the survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan. In that case, only slightly more than half of the original atomic bomb survivors had died by 2005, 55 years after they were exposed (NRC, 2006, page viii) . In order to project the health effects to the end of their lives, assumptions must be made about the relationship between radiation induced, and "naturally occurring" cancers, and the projected life spans of the people remaining in the study. Since the risk estimates currently available are applicable only to populations with known cancer rates and life spans, it is not appropriate to apply these estimates to populations who will be living 10,000 to 1 million years from now, the reason being that it is not scientifically possible to project the baseline cancer rates, or the extent of the life spans that populations will be experiencing, three or four decades from now, much less 10,000 to 1,000,000 years from now.
The problem of transferring risk coefficients derived from the Japanese atomic bomb survivor data to a population far into the future is more completely examined in the enclosure to this submittal, titled "Implications of Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of Appeals."
Perspective on 350 millirem per year
Although the current risk estimates cannot be responsibly used to predict risks to populations at the time the EPA proposed dose rate limit of 350 mrem (0.350 rem) per year would apply, they can be used to provide perspective on the health impacts on current populations that might be affected by radionuclide releases from the proposed repository. Assuming that the Amargosa Valley population was exposed at this rate throughout an average lifetime of 70 years, their total dose would be:
(0.350 rem/year) (70 years) = 24.5 rem = 0.245 Sv.
In this regard, it is important to note that this is higher than 0. For a population the size of that residing in the Amargosa Valley (about 1200 people; Rautenstrauch et al., 2003) , this would mean that the estimated number of excess deaths due to radiation-induced cancer could be:
(1200) (0.014) = ~17.
Because the exposed population is so small, this estimate should probably be expressed as representing something in the range of perhaps 10 to 20 deaths. Since these would be expected to occur, if at all, over the 70 year lifetime of this population group, the average number of excess deaths would range from perhaps one every 7, to one every 3.5, years. The implications of this are discussed in the response to question #2 below. Concurrently, this same population group would be expected to suffer a total of 245 fatal cancers, or about 3 to 4 deaths per year, in the absence of the postulated doses due to radionuclide releases from the proposed repository (NRC, 2006, Table ES-1, page 15).
Is it fair to extrapolate the effects of instantaneous high levels of radiation doses to low level exposure over an individual's lifetime?

Summary Response
No, it is not, the key words being "over an individual's lifetime." Although risk models for fatal cancer have been developed for extrapolating the health effects of radiation exposures involving high doses received at high dose rates to those involving low doses received at low dose rates, the estimated health effects (for example, the number of fatal cancers that might result) can be expressed only for the affected population as a whole. They cannot be expressed in terms of the impacts on individual members of that group. At the same time, it must be recognized that estimates based on these processes are reasonably accurate only if the population group, being evaluated, is large, i.e., numbering in the tens of thousands.
Compounding the situation is that assessments of health effects that involve either small population groups, or small doses will, in general, not be meaningful due to the lack of statistical rigor.
Even when the potentially affected population group is relatively large, the interpretation of the risks is not easy. This is well demonstrated by the information provided in the BEIR VII report (NRC, 2006) . Within a group of 100,000 members of the U.S. population, for example, even in the absence of additional exposure from the proposed repository, there will be, on average, about 20,420 cancer deaths due
Implications of Risk Quantification on the Ruling of the Court of Appeals Introduction
On July 9, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals ruled that the "10,000-year compliance period selected by EPA violates section 801 of the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) (U.S. Congress, 1992) because it is not, as EnPA requires, 'based upon and consistent with' the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences." (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2004) This being the case, the Court ruled that it was incumbent upon EPA to establish a dose rate limit extending from 10,000 to one million years. In contrast, close examination reveals that the recommendation of the National Research Council Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards (NRC, 1995, pages 6-7) stipulated that the "assessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs …" Compliance with the ruling of the Court would, therefore, require that the EPA proposed dose rate limit be converted into an equivalent limit in terms of risk. This can be accomplished only if data on the health effects (cancer risks) per unit of radiation exposure to a future U.S. population, anticipated to exist 10,000 or more years from now, can be estimated. The ramifications of such a task are discussed in the sections that follow with the conclusion that the risk cannot be estimated. The implications of how the scientific issues discussed below impact the implementation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals is strictly that of Dade W. Moeller.
Sources of Information on Radiation Risks
Radiation health-effects experts world-wide agree that the primary sources of data on the cancer related risks of ionizing radiation are those generated through the epidemiological studies of the survivors of the World War II atomic bombings in Japan.
Transfer of Risk Estimates to the U.S. Population
Although the Japanese data are comprehensive, they are directly applicable only to the population group that was exposed at the time of the bombings. They cannot be applied, without modification, to the U.S., or any other population, particularly for interpreting the health effects from potential radionuclide releases from the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository. Even more importantly, they cannot be applied under any conditions for assessing the risks of exposures that occur 10,000 to 1 million years into the future. This is due to a host of reasons, the most prominent of which can be described as follows:
• The exposures in Japan involved relatively high doses received at high dose rates. In contrast, potential radionuclide releases from the proposed repository will involve low doses received at low dose rates. This is important because the health effects, per unit dose, received at low rates are less than those received at high dose rates. This difference is taken into account through the application of what is called a Dose and Dose Rate Effectiveness Factor (DDREF).
• The baseline risks for specific cancers within a population play a dominant role in terms of the magnitude of the excess cancer risks due to radiation exposures. Since the baseline risks for specific cancers within the U.S. population are not the same as those for the Japanese population, there are country-to-country, or spatial, differences in the risks of cancer in different body organs.
• The characteristics of the U.S. population in the future will be different than they are today. This means that there will be temporal differences in the risks of cancer in different body organs, per unit of dose -now as contrasted to the future.
Challenge #1: Converting Health Effects of High Dose and Dose Rates to Low Dose and Dose Rates
Based on extensive reviews and evaluations, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1991, paragraph B62, pages111 -112) , and the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP, 1993, Section 7, page 29) , have recommended that, for the evaluation of the health effects (per unit dose) of low dose and dose rate exposures, the estimated risks (increased cancers) observed among the Japanese a-bomb survivors be divided by a factor of 2.0. As noted above, this is known as the dose and dose rate effectiveness factor (DDREF). Although the BEIR VII committee recommended a value of 1.5 for DDREF (NRC, 2006, page 274) , the value being almost universally applied today is 2.0.
Challenge #3: Transfer of Risk Estimates to Future U.S. Populations
In contrast to the discussion above, the ruling by the Court of Appeals stipulated that a dose rate limit be established for the time-period from 10,000 to one million years after closure of the proposed repository. Again, it is important to note that, while the National Research Council Yucca Mountain Committee (NRC, 1995) recommended that compliance be assessed on the basis of the time of "greatest risk," the Court stipulated that EPA promulgate a dose rate limit for purposes of determining compliance. The only way that a dose rate limit, regardless of its magnitude, has any relevance is if the risk of cancer, associated with that dose rate limit, can be quantified. As noted above, this depends on a host of characteristics of the presumed future population. Only after those characteristics have been defined, can such a transformation be made. That this will be a daunting task is exemplified by the example, discussed immediately above, of the impacts of "westernization" on the Japanese population. This occurred during a period of less than 4 decades. Currently, there is no scientific basis for projecting the changes that will occur during time-periods ranging from 10,000 to one million years.
Since there are multiple characteristics that determine the risks of cancer among exposed members of a population, and many of these are organ specific, this means that a host of characteristics, lifestyles, medical practices, and other factors, within the postulated future population must be specified. The examples that follow illustrate the magnitude and challenges of this task. :
• Cancer screening approaches, such as colonoscopies, during which precancerous lesions can not only be detected, but also removed, thus reducing the incidence of colon cancer. Note: Such a statement presumes that colonoscopies will still be the common among populations living 10,000 to a million years from now! The same general concept applies to the other examples that follow.
• Procedures for vaccinating children for chronic hepatitis B, since such a practice reduced the incidence of liver cancer. In contrast, the increasing rate for Hepatitis C, for which a vaccine does not exist today, may lead to an increase in liver cancer.
• The age at which women have their first child -the younger the age the less risk they have of developing breast cancer in the future.
• The racial composition of the population. African-American men, for example, have higher rates of prostate cancer. In a similar manner, genetic susceptibility to cancer is different for various races.
Since, as noted, the National Research Council Committee (NRC, 1995, pages 6-7) recommended that "compliance assessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs …," it will be necessary to convert the EPA 3.5 mSv (350 mrem) per year dose rate limit (EPA, 2005) into an equivalent risk rate limit. If this is to be accomplished in any reasonably accurate manner, it will be necessary to know the baseline rates for all types of cancer at that time. This, in turn, will require having accurate information not only on the information listed above, but also on:
• How long members of the exposed population are anticipated to live -the risk of cancer increases with longevity, as well as the distribution of the population by age, since the susceptibility to cancer varies with age.
• Projections of future developments of cancer preventive therapies -most especially vaccines for cancers in specific body organs.
• The anticipated exposure of the population group to other carcinogens, such as tobacco.
In short, data will be needed on their age distribution, life spans, baseline cancer rates, exposures to other carcinogens, and dietary habits. In addition, it would require an accurate projection of the status of medical care, medical technology (including the availability of artificial lungs, stomachs, livers, etc.), and multiple other items of information relative to the postulated future population.
Conclusions and Commentary
The recommendation of a dose rate limit, without the ability to estimate the risk that it would represent, would provide essentially no benefit in terms of protecting future population groups. Unless the items of information enumerated above can be made available, it will not be possible to provide a useful dose rate limit. Since the data are not available (and cannot be projected), one can only conclude that it is not scientifically possible for EPA to respond to the ruling of the Court in any meaningful manner.
What the Circuit Court failed to recognize is that the time of "greatest risk" will not necessarily coincide with the time of "peak dose." The relationship between dose and risk is not linear with time, especially when dealing with tens of thousands to a
